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SOLIDARITY OF INTEREST AS BASIS OF LEGAL-
ITY OF BOYCOTTING.
It is my object in the present article to briefly consider the causes
of the conception, enormous in my view, yet extensively prevalent,
that there is anything inherently illegal whatever in a mere boycott;
and more particularly to consider the development of what seems
to be the growing conception of a legitimate "solidarity of inter-
est" as furnishing a sufficient basis for the legality of a boycott,
assuming it to be otherwise illegal.
A vast deal of confusing material is at a stroke swept from our
field of inquiry, when we exclude from consideration illegal acts ac-
companying boycotts, which are too often identified, in the minds
of courts, as well as of the public, with the boycotts themselves.
Such acts commonly consist of actual violence to person or property,
or threats of such violence sufficient to produce a reasonable appre-
hension. It surely seems feasible to draw a sharp distinction be-
tween merely requesting A not to deal with B (to here anticipate
the definition of a boycott) and doing violence to the person or prop-
erty of A, because of his persistence in dealing with B. At any rate
I shall now leave such acts of violence out of consideration, confin-
ing my attention to boycotts as legitimately defined.
In my view a boycott is nothing more or less than the act of a
combination of persons in refusing to deal or in inducing others not
to deal with a third person.* The root idea of a boycott, then, is
merely refusal to deal or inducing others not to deal. Leaving out
of consideration for the present the conception of a number of per-
sons combining in the act of boycotting, and regarding the act of re-
*In addition to the definitions in the standard dictionaries, for instance,
the Century Dictionary, and the law dictionaries of Anderson and Black, see
the definitions of a boycott in Moores v. Bricklayer's Union, 7 Ry. & Corp.
L. J. io8 (Super. Ct. Cinn, 1889); Toledo, Ann Arbor & Ry. Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 73o, 738 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1893); Crump v. Common-
wealth, 84 Va. 927, 940 (1888) ; State v. Glidden, 5s Conn. 46, 77 (1887);
Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135, 143 (Cir. Ct.,
Ohio, 189i) ; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 121 (1894).
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fusal to deal, or of inducing others not to deal, as merely the inde-
pendent act of an individual, it scarcely requites argument that there
is nothing illegal in a boycott. Certainly this is so as to a refusal to
deal. And notwithstanding that some footing has been gained for
the anomalous doctrine that it is actionable to induce another to
break his contract* there has been little or no tendency to go fur-
ther and hold it actionable to merely induce a refusal to deal, in the
absence of any contract relation.
Thus far, then, there is nothing illegal in a boycott. The only
possible element that can infuse illegality into it is the circumstance
that the act of refusing to deal, or of inducing others not to deal,
is that of a combination of persons, as distinguished from the mere
independent act of an individual. Here we encounter another
anomalous doctrine, and one of comparatively recent introduction;
that an act entirely lawful if done by a mere individual, may be un-
lawful by reason of being done in pursuance of a combination of
individuals to do the same act.t Yet on the slender basis of this
anomalous and repudiated doctrine seems to hang the conception
that there is anything in a mere boycott.
But it is not my main object in this article to demonstrate the
fallacy of the conception that there is anything illegal whatever in a
mere boycott. Rather for present purposes I assume that soundness
of such conception, and proceed to attempt to show how its influence
has been pro tanto nullified by the growth of the counteracting doc-
trine that a legitimate solidarity of interest furnishes a Euffcient
basis for the legality of a boycott, assumed to be otherwise illegal. I
*See for instance Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216 (1853), which has been
followed in a number of American discussions, as well as in England.
tSee for instance Toledo-Ann Arbor & Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54
Fed. Rep. 730, 74o (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1893) ; Save v. Same, Id. 746 (Cir. Ct. Ohio,
1893) ; Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420, 427, 431 (1894); Bailey v. Association
of Master Plumbers, Tenn. (i8q9). Although this doctrine, largely Ameri-
can in its development, is professedly based on English decisions, it seems
now to have been repudiated in England. Lee Huttley v. Simmons, i L. R.
Q. B. (1898) i81; Kearney v. Lloyd, 26 L. R. (Ireland) 268 (1898).
The broad doctrine of the inherent illegality of a mere boycott has in
some instances been recognized or applied. See for instance Thomas v. Cin-
cinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 8o3, 81g (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 894) ;
Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. ioi, 122 (1894). As a rule, how-
ever, it is not boycotts, as I have defined them, but acts of coercion accom-
panying boycotts that have been held illegal
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A boycott is conceivable, that is, so to speak, purely wanton;
not being the natural incident or outgrowth of any existing lawful
relation whatever, sustained by the boycotters to any person or
thing. Thus, if an organization of iron workers in Boston should
induce the employees of a manufacturing jeweler in San Francisco
to leave his employ, or his customers to cease to purchase from him,
we should, under ordinary conditions, have an unjustifiable, illegal
boycott, that is if a boycott, as I have defined it, is ever
illegal. For it is not easy to conceive of the Boston iron
workers as having any relation to the San Francisco jew-
eler or his employees, such as to furnish a basis for the
legality of their boycott. But, suppose two rival organiza-
tions of carpenters in Boston, A and B, consisting of 5oo members
each; 200 members of each organization being out of employment
and the other 3oo members of each being in the employment of the
same builder. The builder now enters upon new construction, capa-
ble of furnishing employment to 200 more carpenters. He is inclined
to employ ioo members of each organization. But the members of A
desiring to secure the additional employment for their own unem-
ployed exclusively, inform the employer that unless such employ-
ment is given to the unemployed members of A to the exclusion of
those of B, the members of A already in his employ will refuse to
continue to deal with him, that is, will "strike." The builder, there-
upon, to avoid the annoyance of a strike, gives the additional employ-
ment to the members of A exclusively.
Now, in a sense, injury is done to the unemployed members of
B, -in that they fail to obtain employment that otherwise they would
have obtained. But, is it an actionable injury? No more, it seems
to me, than in case of the injury done every day to one engaged in
trade by a rival, who, by means of superior enterprise in advertising,
for instance, succeeds in securing custom that, but for his efforts,
would have been secured by the other. Of such injuries, the univer-
sal, inevitable result of the struggle for existence, the law can take no
account. They are the natural incident and outgrowth of the rela-
tion in which the members of A are placed, as struggling for the
subsistence and comfort of themselves and families.
It may indeed be urged that, so far as concerns the members of
A already in the employment of the builder, no justification for the
boycott exists. Its immediate result, if successful, is not benefit to
them. They were already in his employment; they continue so to
be. But, as a result of their efforts, others, members of the same
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organization, are benefited. And surely it is a narrow view that the
acts of an individual, as the members of an organization, are to find
justification or condemnation, according to whether the immediate
result of such acts is benefit or injury to him. A few months later
the conditions may be reversed; he may be in the ranks of the unem-
ployed, glad to avail himself of the efforts of his more fortunate
brethren to procure him employment. Thus, in a broad view, the
"solidarity of interest" of the members of the organization justifies
the acts of "all for one," as well as of "one for all."
It was on this doctrine of solidarity of interest that the celebrated
decision in Allen v. Flood,* might, it would seem, have rested. There
the defendant, a "delegate" of a trade union, procured the discharge
of the plaintiff's day laborers (with a promise not to employ them
again), by stating to the employers that members of the union in
their employ would quit employment unless the plaintiffs were dis-
charged. The plaintiffs had become offensive to iron workers, who
were not only members of the union, but also their fellow employees,
by reason of having, though shipwrights, previously worked for cer-
tain employers on "iron work." Although what I call the doctrine
of solidarity of interest was not prominently discussed, yet it was
said in one of the prevailing opinions (p. 132) that "the object which
the defendant and those whom he represented had in view throughout
was what they believed to be the interest of the class to which they
belonged; the step taken was a means to that end."
Allen v. Flood was followed in National Protective Association
v. Cummings, t where the conditions were similar, but the doctrine
of solidarity of interest was much more clearly recognized. There
neither a labor union nor any individual member thereof was held
to have a right of action against a rival labor union or the members
thereof, because of the latter union refusing to permit its members
to work upon any "job" where the members of the former were em-
ployed, and informing the employer in each instance that unless
the members of the former were discharged, its (the latter) members
would abandon the job. As a result members of the former were
discharged, and their places filled by members of the latter. The
court said (p. 231): "It cannot be questioned but that one may
by lawful means obtain employment either for himself or another.
He may procure the discharge by lawful means of another person,
*L. R. App Cas. (1898) 1.
t53 N. Y. App. Dw. 227 (igoo).
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in order that he may obtain employment either for himself or
another. This is all the E association did. It was seeking to ob-
tain employment for its own members." So it was said in another
opinion, that so long as the members of the association "tended
merely to obtain employment for themselves, even though it was
at the expense of the plaintiff and his associates, no legal wrong was
done."*
But in other decisions is manifest a tendency to repudiate or
ignore the solidarity of interest of employees belonging to. the same
organization, as furnishing a basis for the legality of a boycott. This
seems to have been the case in Plant v. Woods,t where the contest
was between "two labor unions of the same craft," the plaintiff
union (A) being composed of workmen who had withdrawn from the
defendant union (B). B being desirous of "having all the members
of the craft subjected to the rules and discipline of their particular
union, in order that they might have better control over the whole
business," took the following measures to cause the members of
A to become members of B: They requested those employing mem-
bers of A to induce the latter to apply for reinstatement in B.
Although there were no threats of personal violence, and although
the members of B did not even expressly ask that the members of A
be discharged, yet it was found from the circumstances under which
such requests were made, the members of B intended that the employ-
ers should fear trouble in their business if they continued to employ
the members of A, and that employers to whom these requests were
made were justified in believing, and did believe, that a failure on
the part of their employees who were members of A to apply for
reinstatement., and a failure on the part of the employers to discharge
them for not doing so would lead to trouble in the business of the
employers, in the nature of strikes or a boycott; that certain strikes
appeared to have been steps taken by the members of B to obtain the
discharge of such employees as were members of A, who declined to
apply for reinstatement. In the dissenting opinion of Holmes, C. J.,
it was, as it seems to me, correctly contended that "the purpose
of the threatened boycotts and strikes was such as to justify the
threats," it being said by this learned jurist, in this connection:
*See also Davis v. United Portable Hoisting Engineers, 28 N. Y. App.
Dw. 396 (1898); also the vigorous argument in the dissenting opinion of
Caldwell, J., in Hopkins v. Oxley Stove Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 912, 935 (Cir. Ct.
App. 8th Cir., 1897).
t176 Mass. 492 (igoo).
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"The immediate object and motive was to strengthen the defendant's
society, as a preliminary and means to enable it to make a better
fight on questions of wages or other matters of clashing interests.
I differ from my brethren in thinking that the threats were as lawful
for this preliminary purpose as for the final one to which strengthen-
ing the union was a means. I think that unity of organization is
necessary to make the contest of labor effectual, and that societies
of laborers lawfully may employ in their preparation the means which
they might use in the final contest." But the majority of the court
concurred in what I regard as the narrow and inadequate view that
"the necessity that the plaintiffs should join this association was not
so great, nor was its relation to the rights of the defendants, as com-
pared with the right of the plaintiff's to be free from molestation,
such as to bring the acts of the defendants under the shelter of the
principles of trade competition."*
Although I have here discussed the doctrine of solidarity of
interest, with especial reference to action by combinations of employ-
ees, the doctrine has a much wider application. Thus, on the ground
of the interest common to a body of tradesmen to protect themselves
against dishonest debtors, have been sustained agreements among
the members of such a body, not to deal with a person indebted to
any one of their number.t Analogous is the case of the interest
common to a body of employers in a contest with employees, as
furnishing a basis for the legality of acts of such employers.1
Frederick H. Cooke.
*For other instances of what seem to me to be more or less distinct fail-
ure to give effect to the doctrine of solidarity of interest as justifying a boy-
cott by employees, see Toledo, Ann Arbor St. Ry Co. v. Pennsylvania Co.,
54 Fed. Rep. 730 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1893); Mocres v. Bricklayers' Union, 7 Ry.
& Corp. L. J. io8 (Super. Ct. Cinn., 1889); Old Dominion Steamboat Co. v.
McKenna, 3o Fed. Rep. 48 (Cir. Ct. N. Y., 1887); Barr v. Essex Trades Coun-
cil, 53 N. J. Eq., 101, 115, 136 (1894); Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical
Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, i8gi); Hopkins v. Oxley Stove Co.,
83 Fed. Rep..912, 921 (Cir. Ct. App. 8th Cir. 1897) ; Thomas v. Cincinnati N.
V. & T. P. Ry. Co. 62 Fed. Reps. 8o3, 8o7 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1894).
tlbelz v. Winpee, 6 Tex. Civ. App. ii (i894); Brewster v. Miller, Ky.
(1897). To similar effect Schutten v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 96 Ky. 224
('894).
tSee Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 42o, 43o (1894); Buchanan v. Kerr, 1594
Pa. St. 433 ('894).
